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Abstract
Examining a standard monopolistic competition model with unspecified util-
ity/cost functions, we find necessary and sufficient conditions on their elastici-
ties for welfare losses to arise from trade or market expansion. Two numerical
examples explain the losses: excessive or insufficient entry of firms can be ag-
gravated by market enlargement (under unrealistic elasticities).
JEL Codes: F12, L13
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Introduction
Gains from trade and large markets are an important issue in monopolistic
competition theory (Melitz and Redding [7]), whereas possible losses are less
studied, unlike in oligopoly settings (Brander and Krugman [1]). Trying to prove
the impossibility of harmful trade, we arrive instead at two counter-examples5
and a criterion (necessary and sufficient condition) for losses. The objective
is to distinguish industries likely or unlikely to be harmed by globalization, by
examining properties of their demand and supply functions.
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This goal requires advanced modelling: variable elasticity of substitution
(VES), unspecified preferences and general-form costs. Our setting deviates10
from Zhelobodko et al. [10] by allowing both convex and concave total cost. This
generalization is needed for an important feature: indirect modelling of endoge-
nous technology (R&D). Indeed, when R&D is possible, higher output fosters
investment in marginal cost reduction, which implies concave cost (Bykadorov
et al. [2]).15
The main result is condition (9) on utilities/costs, necessary and sufficient
for intra-sectoral trade gains or losses in a generalized Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
model. In addition, two numerical examples demonstrate that this requirement
is plausible, i.e., compatible with other reasonable properties of preferences and
costs. Therefore both directions of market distortion shows as theoretically pos-20
sible: excessive or insufficient entry can be aggravated by market growth. How-
ever, utilities/costs that satisfy (9) are uncommon, and the related discussion
shows why trade losses are unlikely in the real economy.
1. Model
The model exposition follows Zhelobodko et al. [10] to ease comparison.25
Our closed economy exhibits monopolistic competition under unspecified addi-
tive utility and cost functions, with variable marginal costs/elasticities. The only
production factor is labor, supplied inelastically by L identical consumers/workers.
A single sector involves an endogenous interval [0, N ] of identical firms produc-
ing varieties, one variety per firm.30
Each consumer maximizes utility in the form
U =
∫ N
0
u(xi)di→ max
X≥0
, s.t.
∫ N
0
pixidi ≤ 1. (1)
Here X = (xj)j≤N is a function, xi ≡ x(i) denotes consumer’s consumption of i-
th variety, pi is the price, w ≡ 1 is wage, index i everywhere replaces parentheses
(i). As in Zhelobodko et al. [10], we use the elasticity operator Eg(z) ≡ zg
′(z)
g(z)
defined for any function g, and the Arrow-Pratt concavity operator rg(z) ≡
− zg′′(z)g′(z) = −Eg′(z).35
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For existence, uniqueness and symmetry of the equilibrium, we make the
following weak restrictions on utility (Zhelobodko et al. [10], Mrzov and Neary
[9]). At some zone [0, zˇ) of possible equilibria (zˇ ≤ ∞), the elementary utility
function u(·) is thrice differentiable—increasing (u′(z) > 0), strictly concave
(u′′(z) < 0), normalized (u(0) = 0)—and its main characteristics behave as40
ru(z) ∈ [0, 1), ru′(z) < 2 ∀z ∈ [0, zˇ).
Then the first-order condition (FOC) with a Lagrange multiplier λ entails
the inverse demand function p for any variety i:
p(xi, λ) =
u′(xi)
λ
. (2)
The marginal utility of income λ serves as the single market aggregate.
Each producer faces some total cost function C(q) depending upon output
q ≡ Lx, perceives function p and λ as given, and maximizes profit
pi (x, λ) ≡ u
′ (x)
λ
xL− C (Lx)→ max
x≥0
.
(Here, choice of maximizers x, q or p brings an equivalent result, and the firm’s
index i is dropped by symmetry.) Denoting revenue R (x, λ, L) ≡ u′ (x)xL/λ,
we can formulate the FOC in usual terms of marginal revenue and marginal
cost: ddxR (x, λ, L)− ddxC (Lx) = 0. The second-order condition (SOC) is
−d
2pi
d2x
= − d
2
d2x
R (x, λ, L) +
d2
d2x
C (Lx) > 0.
This assumption justifies symmetry of the equilibrium.
Equilibrium is a bundle (x¯, p¯, λ¯, N¯) satisfying the utility maximization con-
dition (2); profit maximization FOC and SOC; free-entry and labor market
clearing conditions:
R
(
x¯, λ¯, L
)− C (Lx¯) = 0, (3)
N¯C (Lx¯) = L. (4)
(Upper bar henceforth denotes equilibria.)
Now we can divide each producer’s FOC by the free-entry condition to ex-
press our equilibrium through the elasticity of revenue ER, the elasticity of
3
inverse demand Ep(x) ≡ xp · ∂p(x)∂x ≡ −ru(x) and the cost elasticity EC(q) ≡
q
C · ∂C(q)∂q :
ER(x¯) ≡ 1− ru(x¯) = EC(Lx¯). (5)
The equilibrium consumption x¯ is determined here, whereas equilibrium prices45
p¯ and mass N¯ of firms can be found from the remaining equations. Therefore,
each consumer’s equilibrium welfare U¯ = N¯u(x¯) depends indirectly on market
size L through the equilibrium magnitudes x¯(L), N¯(L).
Totally differentiating the equilibrium equation (5) w.r.t. population size L
and using (4), we express total utility elasticity EU¯/L at equilibrium through
other total elasticities EN¯/L ≡ LN¯ · dN¯dL , Ex¯/L ≡ Lx¯ · dx¯dL and partial elasticity
Eu ≡ Eu(x¯) ≡ zu(z) · ∂u(z)∂z as follows:
EU¯/L ≡
L
U¯
· dU¯
dL
= EN¯/L + Eu · Ex¯/L. (6)
The SOC for profit maximization at equilibrium is
SOC ≡ r′u (x¯) · x¯+ E ′C(Lx¯) · Lx¯ > 0. (7)
(Proofs are in Bykadorov et al. [3].)
2. Losses from market size50
Lemma. The local effect of a growing market on welfare can be expressed
in elasticities (taken at the equilibrium values) as follows:
EU¯/L = (1− Eu)−
x¯2
Eu ·
E ′u · r′u
SOC
= ru +
Lx¯2
Eu ·
E ′u · E ′C
SOC
. (8)
This lemma enables us to establish the necessary and sufficient condition for
“harmful trade” through the following claims, each highlighting some aspect of
market distortion.55
Proposition. Consider an equilibrium x¯ under market size L0. Any lo-
cal welfare reduction caused by a growing market is equivalent to the following
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conditions on utility, revenue and cost elasticities:
EU¯/L < 0⇔ E ′R (x¯) < E ′C(L0x¯) · L0 < E ′R (x¯) ·
ru(x¯)
1− Eu(x¯) . (9)
For a more convenient interpretation, this double inequality can be reformu-
lated as follows.60
Corollary. (i) [Necessity]. For any welfare reduction two conditions are
necessary:
E ′u(x¯) · E ′R(x¯) < 0, (10)
E ′u(x¯) · E ′C(Lx¯) < 0. (11)
In particular, under convex cost (E ′C > 0), such reduction requires both increas-
ingly elastic revenue (IER) and decreasingly elastic utility (DEU).
(ii) [Sufficiency]. For any utility satisfying inequality (10) at some x¯ under
given L0, one can find a cost function C such that x¯ is an equilibrium, and
welfare locally decreases w.r.t. L at L0. One can find also another cost function65
C˜ that makes welfare locally increasing.
Discussion. Under properties (9), (10) and (11) holding globally, these
claims are easily extended from infinitesimal changes in population and welfare
(dU¯dL ) onto global ones (
∆U¯
∆L ).
Why are equilibria satisfying all conditions (9), (10) and (11) unlikely? Prop-70
erty E ′R(x) ≡ −r′u(x) < 0 is called decreasingly elastic revenue (DER), being
equivalent to increasingly elastic (strictly subconvex) demand (Mrzov and Neary
[8]). The DER case is called realistic by Krugman [6] and subsequent papers
(see Zhelobodko et al. [10]) because it generates decreasing prices under in-
creasing competition; DER is perceived as “Marshall’s Second Law of Demand”75
by Mrzov and Neary [8]. Then, (9) becomes 1 >
−E ′C(Lx¯) · L
r′u(x¯)
> ru(x¯)1−Eu(x¯) .
To get losses, some C(.) must fit this double inequality, compatible only when
Eu < 1 − ru = ER, which is problematic. Indeed, finite u′(0) > 0 (choke-
price) and negative u′(∞) < 0 (satiabile demand) are reasonable assump-
tions that entail Eu = 1, limx→∞ Eu(x) < 0. Then, Eu generally decreases:80
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0 ≥ EEu ≡ ER − Eu : [0,∞), except, maybe, for some interval. For EU¯/L < 0,
the equilibrium must occur in this interval, which is empty for all typical utilities:
CARA, HARA, CES, quadratic. Even for specially constructed exotic utilities,
the interval is tiny, the freedom of choice in (9) being small: ru(x¯)1−Eu(x¯) ≈ 1 (see
our examples). Moreover, reasonable cost specifications C ≡ f + c(f)q where85
function c(f) decreases not too quickly, yield E ′C > 0, which is incompatible
with (9) when E ′R(x) < 0. Summarizing, too many very stringent conditions
must hold simultaneously to generate losses from trade.
Literature and interpretation. Elasticities’ role in welfare is known since
Dixit and Stiglitz [4]: under linear cost (C ≡ f + cq), CES yields optimum,90
whereas firms’ entry is socially excessive in DEU case (E ′u < 0) but insufficient
under IEU (E ′u > 0). Under market expansion, such a distortion diminishes
under DER, and the consumer enjoys a “double benefit” from growing variety
and decreasing prices (Krugman [6]). This claim is generalized to convex cost
in Zhelobodko et al. [10], to costly trade in Mrzov and Neary [9], and to firms’95
heterogeneity in Dhingra and Morrow [5], where functions ru(x) and 1− Eu(x)
are called “markup” and “social markup,” respectively. These two are “aligned”
when both increase (DER, DEU) or both decrease (IER, IEU); when preferences
are aligned, market expansion increases welfare. In economic terms, “the market
maximizes markup but the social planner pursues social markup; when these100
goals are aligned, demand shifts alter private and social markups in the same
direction” (Dhingra and Morrow [5]).
We have shown that aligned preferences serve also as a necessary condition
for welfare gains, in the sense of “gains occuring under any cost function.”
Another contribution is non-linear cost, e.g., endogenous technology. Though105
according to Dhingra and Morrow [5] “these are the demand-side elasticities
that determine how resources are misallocated and when ... market expansion
provides welfare gains” but (9) shows that costs also matter.
The only mathematical example of harmful trade in the New Trade theory
that we know—we have learned from Peter Neary in private talk, 2013. It110
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exploits a non-normalized utility, e.g., u(x) =
√
x− a (a > 0), that violates our
assumptions. However, we do not perceive violating normalization as legitimate.
Indeed, an arbitrary constant added to the sub-utility should not change all the
welfare conclusions from plus to minus. Instead, we provide two legitimate
examples.115
[Insert Figure here]
Example 1: IER and DEU (excessive entry aggravated, Fig.2.1, left
panel)
To demonstrate the possibility of harmful trade, we extend the CARA utility
with a linear or polynomial term:120
u(x) =
 1− exp (−x) + 2x if x < 2− exp (−x) + 3x− 0.25x2 if x ≥ 2
 .
Here IER property holds under x < 2, where all our equilibria lie (inter-
val x ≥ 2 is constructed only to satisfy our restrictions on u). Elasticity
Eu(x) = (2+exp(−x))x1−exp(−x)+2x is computed and plotted by software as the thick orange
dotted curve in the figure. Revenue elasticity ER(x) = 1− ru(x) = exp(−x)x2+exp(−x) is
painted thick blue. The initial market size is L1 = 3.4447; related cost elasticity125
EC(L1x) = L1cxf+L1cx is painted dashed thick magenta (C(q) ≡ f + cq = 1 + q).
The equilibrium equation (5) here means the lower of the two intersections
between ER(x) and EC(L1x), almost indistinguishable because of almost tan-
gent curves: ru(x¯)1−Eu(x¯) ≈ 1 ⇒ E ′C ≈ E ′R). This (pink) equilibrium point is
x1 ≈ 1.98683, U1 ≈ 2.12396. When market size expands to L2 = 3.446, we130
get a new, thin dashed, curve EC(L2x), which almost coincides with old curve
EC(L1x). It brings a new (black) equilibrium point with smaller consumption
and utility: x2 ≈ 1.96165 < x1, U2 ≈ 2.12389 < U1. The mass of firms increases
(N1 = 0.439149 < N2 = 0.444081) but insufficiently.
Initially, excessive entry here implies inefficiently high average costs. Sub-135
sequently, an increase in L pulls the average cost up, driving the economy fur-
ther away from optimum. Individual consumption decreases, being insufficiently
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compensated by increasing variety. However, excessive entry is aggravated by
market expansion only if cost elasticity is almost tangent to revenue elasticity,
as one can understand from ru(x¯)1−Eu(x¯) ≈ 1.140
Example 2: DER and IEU (insufficient entry aggravated, Fig.2.1, right
panel)
Consider be-power utility
u(x) =
 0.5
√
0.125 + x− 0.125x3/4 + 0.125 · 2−1/4 if x ≥ 0.1
6.04076x− 28.4021x2 if x < 0.1
 .
All our equilibria belong to x ≥ 0.1; the initial interval x ∈ [0, 0.1] is constructed
to fit our assumption u(0) = 0. The non-linear cost function is C(q) = 0.2 +
1.5 exp
(
−1/√q/7). Fig.2.1-right maintains the same colours and legend as the145
left panel. Under L1 = 4.25, the first equilibrium point is x1 ≈ 0.669948, U1 ≈
3.7994. Increasing the market size to L2 = 4.47, we get another equilibrium
point with higher consumption x2 ≈ 0.921192 > x1 and smaller utility U2 ≈
3.6732 < U1. The mass of firms decreases noticeably: N2 = 7.36122 < N1 =
8.28935.150
Unlike the previous example, the initial social distortion takes here the form
of insufficient entry (variety) and related low average costs. Then, in response to
increasing L, variety further decreases, being insufficiently compensated by the
consumption hike and thus further departs from optimum. Again, distortion is
aggravated by market expansion only when cost elasticity is almost tangent to155
revenue elasticity (8).
To summarize, losses from trade require several highly stringent conditions to
hold simultaneously: increasingly elastic misaligned preferences and quite spe-
cific costs. For more definite conclusion, condition (9) should be falsified or
confirmed empirically.160
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Figure 0.1: Misaligned elasticities and welfare loss: two examples
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